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On June 15, 1975, and notwithstanding his physical and mental problems, the Plaintiff returned to work in the mines where
he continued to work without significant interruption until April
21, 1976.

Tr. Vol. I, p. 136.

During that time, Plaintiff con-

tinued to obtain chiropractic adjustments for his physical problems and therapy for his depression.
In May, 1976, Plaintiff sought follow-up medical treatment
for his back which had some limitation in motion and additional
tenderness in his left buttocks.

He also had decreased sensation

over the lateral aspect of his calf and foot on the left side.
Tr. Vol. II, pp. 167 and 409; and Vol. I, p. 47.
Subsequently, on June 29, 1976, a three-level

fusion was

performed by Dr. Thomas E. Soderberg at the L.D.S. Hospital in
Salt Lake City, Utah.

Tr. Vol. I, p. 48; and Vol. II, p. 167.

Because two of the levels failed, a second surgery was performed
on December 1, 1977, where Plaintiff's back was again re-fused.
Tr. Vol. II, pp. 190-191 and 409.
On March 21, 1977, and as a result of those two surgeries,
the

Industrial

awarding

Commission

Plaintiff

approved

a 25% permanent

a

Compensation

partial

whole body for his orthopedic problems.

Agreement

impairment

of

the

Tr. Vol. I, p. 24.

Over five years later, on June 11, 1982, Plaintiff filed an
Application for Hearing requesting an additional permanent partial

impairment

award

for his psychiatric

problems

and, also,

requesting consideration of a permanent total disability award.
Tr. Vol. I, p. 37.

Dr. Potts, Plaintiff's treating physician of approximately
five

years,

confirmed

Plaintiff's

permanent

total

disability

status by letter on September 24, 1984 by stating that he was
"... unable to work or perform steadily...." and that he doubted
that "... his position [would] improve".

Tr. Vol. II, p. 156.

Dr. Bradford D. Hare of the University of Utah Pain Clinic confirmed

Plaintiff's

inability

to work, and

indicated

that

the

Plaintiff is impaired in social, family and vocational functioning, in a medical report of February 13, 1985.

This report fur-

ther substantiated Plaintiff's total disability status.

Tr. Vol.

II, p. 613.
Ms. JoAnn Pace of the Four Corners Community Mental Health
Center in Castle Dale, Utah also confirmed Plaintiff's permanent
total disability status by letter of May 21, 1985 indicating that
"... my impression at this time is that the employee is suffering
from post traumatic stress disorder with depression.

His rumina-

tion of the traumatic event, his anxiety and severe physical pain
could most definitely

prevent him

from working at this time".

Tr. Vol. II, pp. 613-614.
And finally, Dr. Ronald G. Rubin, a psychiatrist in Price,
Utah, in a letter of July 10, 1985, pursuant to a Division of
Rehabilitation

referral,

indicated

that

Plaintiff

was

neither

rehabilitable now nor was he expected to be so in the future, was
not employable now or in the future, and was not able to partake
in a new vocation, and was in fact 100% disabled.
p. 614.
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Tr. Vol. II,

On October
Plaintiff's

9,

claim

1984, the Administrative
to

an

additional

award

Law Judge

for

his

denied

psychiatric

impairment, but found him "... tentatively permanently and totally disabled and referred [him] to the Division of Rehabilitation
Services for evaluation, training and certification as required
by Section 35-1-67, U.C.A."

Tr. Vol. II, p. 412,

On July 31, 1985, the Utah State Board of Education, Division of Rehabilitation Services, found that Plaintiff was ineligible

for rehabilitation because his handicap was "too severe"

and a recent psychiatric evaluation revealed that he had
significant work potential...."

f!

. . . no

In addition to Plaintiff's phys-

ical and mental impairments, that Division also found that he had
borderline intellectual functioning and reading skills primarily
as a result of his dropping out of school in the tenth grade.
The Division
that

issued

there was no

the Section 67 certification by concluding
lf

. . . reasonable

expectation

that

vocational

rehabilitation services [could] benefit [him] in terms of employability."

Tr. Vol. II, p. 562.

On December 11, 1985, the Administrative Law Judge entered
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order finding that
the Plaintiff was "... entitled to benefits for permanent total
disability

benefits

Vol. II, p. 564.

from

and

after

July

31,

1985...."

Tr.

The date chosen by the Adminsitrative Law Judge

for the commencement of benfits was the date of the Section 67
Division of Rehabilitation
rehabilitation services.

-6

certification

of non-entitlement

Tr. Vol. II, p. 562.

to

No mention was

made in the Order for the payment of interest on unpaid benefits
then long since due.

Tr. Vol. II, pp* 561-565.

On December 19, 1985, Plaintiff filed his Motion for Reconsideration/Motion for Review challenging the onset date of permanent

total disability

benefits, and the lack of an award

statutory interest on the unpaid but due benefits.
pp. 569-573.
disability
letter

Plaintiff

argued

benefits based

is inconsistent

upon

with

policy wherein permanent

that computing

for

Tr. Vol. II,

permanent

total

the date of the rehabilitation

longstanding

Industrial

Commission

total disability benefits onset dates

are computed from the date of Plaintiff's industrial accident, or
the date on which the Plaintiff las^ worked, whichever is later.

Tr. Vol. II, p. 569.

In addition, Plaintiff argued that

statutory interest is awarded on permanent total disability benefits as it is on any other unpaid but due Workers1 Compensation
benefits.

Tr. Vol. II, p. 572.

On March 13, 1986, the Industrial Commission granted in part
and denied in part Plaintiff's Motion for Peconsideration/Mot ion
for Review.

Tr. Vol. II, pp. 574-576.

trial Commission held

Specifically, the Indus-

fl

. . . that the first date of medical con-

firmation of the Applicants permanent total disability status is
a more appropriate date to begin permanent total disability benefits...11 (Tr. Vol. II, p. 576) and ". . . that an award for interest is inappropriate.../1

Tr. Vol. II, p. 576.

No explanation

for either of these two conclusions was given in the Order.
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Plaintiff

timely

petitioned

this Court

for review of the

Industrial Commission's final administrative decision.

Tr. Vol.

II, p. 578.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
It is Plaintiff's contention that the Industrial Commission
acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it ordered the payment of
permanent total disability benefits to commence on September 24,
1984.

Plaintiff contends that the proper date for the commence-

ment of such benefits

is April 22, 1976 which

is the last day

Plaintiff was able to work as a coal miner and was forced out of
the work force by his industrial injury.
other evidence submitted
disabling
jury.

All of the medical and

supports Plaintiff's argument that his

symptoms are attributable

to his 1975 industrial in-

To select a date other than April 22, 1976 is an arbitrary

and capricious act.
And finally, Plaintiff contends that the Industrial Commission erred in refusing to award interest in compliance with Utah
Code Annotated §35-1-78 (1981).
trial Commission

Continued refusal of the Indus-

to comply with the statutory requirements and

this Court's interpretations thereof underscores the Industrial
Commission's tenuous position in this case.
ARGUMENT
I
THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO HAVE
HIS PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY AWARD
RECOMPUTED TO PROVIDE FOR THE COMMENCEMENT
OF BENEFITS ON APRIL 22, 1976, THE "DAT
FOLLOWING HIS LAST DAY OF WORK

The remedial nature of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act
is to assure, among other things, that workers who are injured
while performing their duties are compensated for the loss suffered as a result of an industrial accident.
ensation

Act

provides

for

various

types

The Workmen's Comp-

of benefits

to which

employees are entitled as soon as a compensable injury removes
them from the work force.
Utah Code Annotated §35-1-64 (1973) mandates when compensation under the Workmen1s Compensation Act must commence.

This

commencement date, which is no lateii than three days after the
injury, or sooner, supports Plaintiff's position that the critical date is when the injured employee was forced out of the work
force by his injury.
In this case, there is no dispute that Plaintifffs last day
of work as a coal miner was April 21, 1976.

More importantly,

there is no dispute that all the medical reports submitted herein
conclude that it was the industrial injury sustained by Plaintiff
on May 12, 1975 that rendered him permanently totally disabled
and has forced him out of the work force.

All of Plaintiff's

disabling symptoms, according to the uncontradicted medical reports, are attributable to his 1975 industrial injury.
The

Industrial

Commission, without

any

expressed

reason,

arbitrarily and capriciously selected September 24, 1984, as the
date from which permanent total disability benefits shall be paid
notwithstanding the fact that he hasi not worked for over _a decade!

-7-

It should be noted that Plaintiff1s argument is based upon
the long adhered

to Indutrial Commission rule that payment of

benefits shall commence on the date of the accident or the last
day

an injured

employee worked, whichever

is later.

Notwith-

standing that rule, the Industrial Commission for the first time
in 70 years has arbitrarily and capriciously discerned that a new
rule should be implemented regarding identifying the date for the
commencement of the payment of benefits.
What the Industrial Commission

is so vainly attempting to

conceal is its effort to arbitrarily limit the financial exposure
of the Second Injury Fund by fiat rather than by seeking appropriate legislative relief, thereby, once again, ignoring the recommendation of this Court that the Legislature is the appropriate
forum

to

limit

the

financial

exposure

of

the

Second

Injury

Fund.
By arbitrarily and capriciously picking a later onset date,
the financial exposure of the Second Injury Fund can be limited
without the authority of any statutory, regulatory or case law.
In fact, this arbitrary change in policy overrules 70 years of
the Commission's own procedural history.
This arbitrary and capricious choice of the Industrial Commission is wholly without cause and is not supported by any substantial

evidence.

Utah, 674 P.2d
the Workmen's

Billings

Computer

Corporation

v. Tarango,

104 (1983).

To preserve the remedial nature of

Compensation

Act, and even the integrity of the

Industrial Commission, this Court must reverse the Commission's
decision in this case.

To fulfill the purpose of the Workmen's
-8-

Compensation

Act

and

secure

workers

from becoming

objects of

charity by making reasonable compensation, Platiniff urges this
Court to rule that the onset date for the payment of benefits to
which he is entitled be the date he was forced out of the work
force by the industrial accident.
II
THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO STATUTORY INTEREST
ON HIS PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY AWARD
Utah

Code Annotated

§35-1-78

(1981) provides

that awards

made by the Industrial Commission shall include interest at the
rate of 8%, from the date each benefit payment would have otherwise become due and payable.
Invoking this clear and unambiguous statute merely requires
that the Plaintiff demonstrate his entitlement to benefits.

Once

an employee is entitled to benefits, the statute requires that
interest at the stated rate be paid.

This interpretation was

recently approved by this Court in Marshall v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 704 P.2d 581 (1985).
Despite the clear and unambigupus language of the statute
and this Courtfs interpretation of it, the Industrial Commission
refused

to

award

Plaintiff

interest

on

the benefits

awarded.

Such action by the Industrial Commission forces workers, such as
Plaintiff, to seek redress in this Court.

A statute which is so

simple and clear as to purpose should not result in an appeal.
Plaintiff

submits that the Industrial Commission has once

again demonstrated its intention to Refuse to follow the dictates
of this Court and the Legislature when it declined to award in-9-

terest.

Plaintiff

further

submits that the Industrial Commis-

sion's action in refusing to pay interest is additional evidence
of its arbitrary attempt to limit the financial exposure of the
Second Injury Fund.
CONCLUSION
The

Plaintiff

respectfully

requests

that

the

Industrial

Commission be directed, once again, to comply with the Workers1
Compensation statutory requirements of the law as they have been
interpreted by the decisions of this Court.

The clear and con-

sistent failure of the Industrial Commission to do so only exacerbates

injured

workers1

compensation

rights,

violates

the

remedial nature of Workers1 Compensation legislation, and further
and unnecessarily results in needless appeals being taken to this
Court for the purpose of reversing arbitrary and capricious decisions of the Industrial Commission.
the

Industrial

The final

Commission

should

administrative

decision

of

be reversed

remanded

with direction to recompute the Plaintiff's

and

permanent

total disability benefits from April 22, 1976, with interest from
that date as required by the Code.
DATED this 18th day of August, L9£6.

EY bt DABNEY, P/JC: '

w\fs "DABNEY / E?O"J
eys for Plaintiff
I
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify

that I served

four

(4) true and correct

copies of the foregoing document, postage prepaid, on this the
18th day of August, 1986, upon the following:

David L. Wilkinson, Esq.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF UTAH
124 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Henry K. Chai III, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
P. 0. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84TiO
DABfeNEBf & pABNEY, P f C

v IRG ifror'ftflfiraY, { ES
Attorney^ for Plainti
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

CHARLES OMAN
Appicant, *
•
* I
PEABOOY COAL COflPAHV

,

COMPENSATION^

AGREEMENT

'

w

^

*

(Saployer) *

OLD REPUBLIC COMPANIES

*
*

(Insurance Carrier)
Defendant

<< ' T T

*
*
*
*

WHEREAS,
Charles Oman
sustained a personal injury by
accident arising out of and in the course of his employment on the 12th day
of May
19.75while employed by Peabody Coal Company
;
which accident has been duly reported to the Industrial Commission of the State
of Utah. According to the physician's reports and agreement between the parties
hereto, said Applicant sustained, as a result of said accident, temporary total
disability and/or permanent partial disability, as well as incurring medical and/
or hospital expenses, as hereinafter set forth:

May 12 to June 15, 1975 less two days and
1.
*2.

Temporary total disability from April 30, 1976
to December 3 % 1976 Inc.
payable at the rate of $ 95.33per week for a total of $ So^Z. 1 1
.
Permanent partial disability based on
73
weeks payable at the rate of
$ 95.33per week beginning January 1, 19//
f o r a total of 7435.74
Said permanent partial disability consists of the specific loss as follows:

25% permanent partial disability

3*

Recapitulation of compensation benefits paid in connection with this claim:
(a) Medical—Hospital and Miscellaneous Incurred $ 4335.41
Paid to Date
$ ^o.<n
Note 1
Balance (if any) Due
$ None
(b) Total Weekly Compensation Benefits Due
$ 3772.34
Paid to Date
$ bbZZ.H
Balance (if any) Due
($ 1849.77)Note 2
(c) Total Medical and Compensation Due
t
per this Compensation Agreement:
$ 5535.97 A-*rtl, -'

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the payment of the amount stated in
Section 3 above—as provided by law—the Applicant hereby releases Defendants
from any further responsibility in connection with said accident except as may
be changed from time to time under the powers of the Industrial Commission of
Utah to retain continuing jurisdiction to modify awards and extend medical
benefits.
It is understood that this Agreement becomes binding and effective only
when approved by a member of the Industrial Cossnission of Utah.

0/^

Approved this

2./ day of

Ox*
<ftyyg

v?-fsi^

Note 1: Travel and per diem of $351.90 was also paid.

"uu^-

* Supporting medical evidence of permanent partial disability must accompany
this form.
Note 2: 31 weeks compensation was paid at rate of $155.00 in error.
NOTE: Original will be retained by the Corrcnission. Signed copies will be
returned to the Insurance Carrier.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 82002249

CHARLES G. OMAN,
*
Applicant,

FINDINGS OF FACT

vs.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

PEABODY COAL COMPANY and/or
OLD REPUBLIC and SECOND
INJURY FUND,

*
*
*

AND ORDER

Defendants.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

BEFORE:
APPEARANCES:

*
* *

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on September 24,
1984 at 1:00 p.m. o'clock. Said hearing was pursuant
to Order and,Notice of the Commission.
Richard G. Sumsion, Administrative Law Judge.
The applicant was present and represented by Virginius
Dabney, Attorney at Law.
The defendants, Peabody Coal Company and/or Old
Republic Insurance, were represented by Henry Chai,
Attorney at Law.
The Second Injury Fund
Martinez, Administrator.

was

represented

by Gilbert

FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. The applicant herein was injured in an industrial accident on May
12, 1975 during the course c<f his employment by Peabody Coal Company. The
occurrence of the accident is not questioned but the extent of injuries
sustained as a result of the accident are subject to considerable doubt.
2. The accident involved a cave-in in which three of the miners lost
their lives and others were injured. One of those who was killed was only a
few feet away from the applicant and was trying to rescue others at the time
he was killed. The applicant may not have been able to prevent him from
getting into the situation leading to his death, but apparently the applicant
felt that he could have prevented him from doing so and this has caused him to
have a lot of guilt feelings. After this employee was killed in the cave-in

CHARLES G. OMAN
FINDINGS OF FACT
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the applicant turned to run and was struck across the back by one of the mine
timbers.
One might suspect that the applicant would have been seriously
injured by this timber but there was certainly no immediate indication of
such. The applicant did say that he experienced a lot of low back pain but on
the other hand he continued working in the search and rescue effort for three
or four more hours and when he finally did go to the Emery Medical Center his
main complaints were emotional not physical. The night of the accident, he
was treated for hyperventilation and given Valium and the Clinic did not even
make note of any low back pain or injury. In fact, the applicant was in such
a state of emotional unrest and confusion that he drove to Page, Arizona for
unknown reasons. His wife was so concerned about him that she followed him to
Page. However, the applicant was seen by a chiropractor in Price on May 15,
1975 and was treated for "traumatic lumbo sacral sprain with radiculitis
unilateral on the left side." He continued seeing a chiropractor quite
regularly for the next several months. Because of his depression, he also
went to the Four Corners Mental Health Clinic in Price. There he complained
of restlessness and feelings of anxiety and nervousness and an unwillingness
to go back into the mine. He complained of not sleeping and having dreams of
the horrible incident at the mine. He was also having marital problems and he
embarked upon a course of psychotherapy for the purpose of getting him back
into the mine and helping him with his marriage. This program was successful
and he did return to work in the mine by June 15. He then worked without
interruption until around April of 1976* During that time he continued to
obtain some chiropractic adjustments but it is unknown as to just what extent
or at what frequency these adjustments were administered* The records of the
chiropractor, now deceased, have not been located.
3. There is no indication that the applicant saw a medical doctor
regarding his back problems until May 4, 1976, approximately one year after
the accident, at which time he saw Dr. N.K. Dean in Price. Dr. Dean referred
him to Dr. Soderberg in Salt Lake City. Dr. Soderberg saw him for the first
time on May 7, 1976. He was noted at that time to have mild limitation of
motion in his back and tenderness in the left buttock. He had decreased
sensation over the lateral aspect of the calf and foot on the left side but
his reflexes and straight leg raising tests were normal. Shortly thereafter a
fusion of his back was recommended but he wanted to wait a while longer. The
fusion was performed on June 29, 1976. This was a three level fusion, two of
which apparently failed making it necessary to refuse the back and this was
done in December of 1977.
4.
After the first
surgery, the applicant entered into a
Compensation Agreement with the insurance carrier dated March 21, 1977. This
agreement acknowledged that he had received temporary total disability
compensation from May 12 to June 15, 1975 less two days and again from April
30, 1976 to December 31, 1976. He also received compensation for permanent
partial disability based on a rating of 25% of the whole person. At that
time, no mention was made of any psychiatric problems and no claim for such
was submitted. The applicant has never returned to work following the surgery

CHARLES G. OMAN
FINDINGS OF FACT
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of June 29, 1976. Prior to the surgery in December of 1977, the applicant
filed an application for additional benefits specifically noting that a fusion
had failed and that further surgery was recommended.
Liability for the
additional claim was denied but later the insurance company reversed its
position and paid for the additional medical expenses and for additional
temporary total disability through September 7, 1978. No additional permanent
partial disability was paid because Dr. Soderberg indicated the fusion had
been made solid by the second surgery and there had been no increase in the
permanent partial disability.
5. The applicant received social security disability compensation
for approximately four years but these payments were discontinued in 1980.
The termination of the applicant's social security disability benefits may
have prompted his filing for further workmen's compensation benefits. The
applicant's claim for such was filed on August 19, 1982 and his claim at that
time was for additional permanent partial disability or permanent total
disability.
6.
From the evidence presented, it is clear there has been no
increase in the applicant's ^permanent partial impairment due to his back
injury. This was rated at 25% by Dr. Soderberg in 1977 and he reconfirmed his
opinion as late as 1982. The only evidence of increased impairment relates to
the ratings recently assigned to his psychiatric impairment which was not
rated by any physician until March of 1983. This rating was assigned by Dr.
Frank Dituri, a specialist in internal medicine, based upon his application of
the criteria set forth in the Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment
published by the American Medical Association and his assessment of the
applicant's psychiatric problems.
This evaluation was made without the
benefit of any of the records from the Four Corners Medical Center and Dr.
Dituri acknowledged that it would be very helpful to have these records. The
applicant was later seen by Dr. Jack L. Tedrow, a psychiatrist, who
essentially confirmed Dr. Dituri's earlier assessment of a 25% psychiatric
impairment.
Dr. Dituri
recently
responded
to
a request
from the
Administrative Law Judge relative to the onset of this impairment and it is
obvious from his letter dated August 7, 1984 that he made a mistake with
respect to the date of the industrial accident. In his original report and in
two places in his August 7, 1984 report he refers to the accident as having
occurred on March 12, 1979. Obviously, his records to finding no evidence of
ratable impairment as early as January, 1977 is based on his incorrect
assumption that this was prior to the industrial accident when in fact it was
subsequent to the accident and the records of the Four Corners Medical Health
Center make it rather clear that the applicant did in deed have significant
psychiatric problems immediately following the industrial accident on March
12, 1975.
7. In retrospect, with the benefit of hindsight, it appears rather
evident that the applicant's present problems have been greatly magnified by
several factors pertaining to the manner in which his case has been handled.

CHARLES G. OMAN
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It seems rather apparent that the applicant's physical impairment resutling
from his industrial accident was not particularly significant. For more than
a year after the accident his physical complaints apparently warranted no more
than periodic chiropractic adjustments and he was able to return to work: and
perform his duties in the mine. Similarly, his understandable psychiatric
problems and phobic reaction to working in the mine were significantly reduced
by the treatment he received at the Four Corners Mental Health Center. The
consultation received at the Mental Health Center did enable him to return to
the mine and resume his employment and one might easily have concluded at that
time that the industrial accident had little long range significance. Now,
nine years later, the applicant considers himself permanently and totally
disabled.
There is absolutely no evidence that the applicant benefited in any
way from the first surgical procedure and the second surgical procedure was
only beneficial in the sense of correcting the pseudo-arthrosis.
The
surgeries took him out of the work environment and created a real inability to
work for a period of time, and this, superimposed upon his psychiatric
problems, have combined to convince him that he is indeed unemployable*
After this long length of - time there is probably no realistic hope
for reversing this dismal attitude problem although proper psychotherapy at
the appropriate time may well have been successful. When the applicant became
disabled as a result of his surgeries, there was obvious justification for his
determination of total disability by the Social Security Administration but
this only compounded the problems because it removed him *from active
management as a workmen's compensation claim and did nothing to restore him to
suitable gainful employment at a time when this was realistically possible.
The applicant complains that his social security disability benefits were
terminated but in all likelihood the more realistic tragedy is that he was
kept on social security disability as long as he was. At the time of the
accident, the applicant was a young man of only 35 years of age and his
prospects for rehabilitation should have been excellent. The fact that he
remains unemployed nine years later is an indictment on the system and the
applicant's failure or inability to understand the adverse impact of that
system upon him. Consequently, the Administrative Law Judge finds that the
applicant was by no means rendered permanently and totally disabled as a
result of the industrial accident even though the accident combined with the
circumstances that have followed may well have relegated him to that status.
8. Because of the foregoing, it is necessary for the Administrative
Law Judge to view the applicant's claim in three different perspectives:
(1) Whether or not his present claim for additional compensation based upon
his psychiatric problems is nothing more than a modification of the 1977
compensation
agreement
and therefore not subject to any statute of
limitations,
(2) Whether or not the psychiatric impairment represented a
significant change in the applicant's condition so as to warrant an award of
additional compensation under the continuing jurisdiction of the Commission
conferred by Section 35-1-78 and, if so, whether or not the Commission still
has jurisdiction to enter such an award more th^n nine years after the
accident, and (3) Whether or not the applicant can be found permanently and
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totally disabled as a result of his industrial accident at this time, in which
case his claim would not be subject to the eight year statute of limitations
set forth in Section 35-1-66, U.C.A. Addressing the applicant's claim from
the first two perspectives mentioned, Section 35-1-78 confers continuing
jurisdiction on the Commission to make such modification or change with
respect to former findings or orders as it may from time to time feel
justified.
In the annotation regarding the case of Spencer v. Industrial
Commission 4 Ut 2d 185, 290 P2d 692, it is noted that even though the
ff
doctrine of res judicata.. .is not in the strict sense applicable to
proceedings before the Industrial Commission (.)(T)his does not mean that an
applicant can reapply to the Commission for a new determination upon the same
facts merely because he may be dissatisfied with his former order, but it does
mean once the application has been filed and the Commission's jurisdiction
invoked, it has authority to entertain further proceedings to deal with any
substantial changes or unexpected developments that may arise as a result of
the injury. On this criteria, the Administrative Law Judge finds that this is
not an appropriate case for further consideration under Section 35-1-78. It
is rather evident that the same facts have prevailed for approximately the
last seven years. Even though the psychiatric impairment was not rated until
relatively recently, the impairment itself was obviously in place long ago.
The foregoing is deemed dispositive of the first two perspectives.
As to the third perspective, that of the applicant's claim for permanent total
disability, the Administrative Law Judge finds that the facts warrant a
tentative finding of permanent and total disability simply because the
applicant has not been gainfully employed for the past eight years. The
Administrative Law Judge is firmly convinced that had appropriate measures
been taken, the applicant would have been an excellent candidate for
rehabilitation and would be working today. However his attitude problems may
be so deeply &ntrenched that rehabilitation will be difficult if not
impossible but his age at least is in his favor. At age 44, he is still a
relatively young man. It is not enough to presume that the applicant can
obtain suitable gainful employment and under circumstances of this type it is
incumbent upon the defendants to demonstrate that he is capable of
rehabilitation. This concept appears to be clearly supported by the case of
Brunddge v. IML Freight. 622 P2d 790 (1980).
9. No compensation for permanent total disability is to be awarded
until a final determination is made relative to whether or not the applicant
is permanently and totally disabled. In the meantime, he should be referred
to the Division of Rehabilitation Services for evaluation, training and
certification as required by Section 35-1-67, U.C.A. It is the recommendation
of the Administrative Law Judge that the defendants have the applicant
evaluated at a pain clinic of their choosing and this should be done before
the
evaluation
by
Rehabilitation
Services.
Obviously,
any
other
rehabilitation services the defendants wish to employ would be appropriate.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The applicant is entitled to a tentative finding of permanent and
total disability and referral to rehabilitation services as required by
Section 35-1-67, U.C.A. The facts of this case do not justify a modification
of the prior compensation
agreement
entered
into
in 1977 and the
Administrative Law Judge does not believe the Commission has jurisdiction to
consider a claim for increased permanent partial impairment at this late
datec
This case is clearly distinquishable from the Gamier case on which
applicant relies. Failure to enter an award within the eight year period
prescribed by statute in the instant case was not attributable to the
Commission's inability to do so.

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant be found tentatively
permanently
and
totally
disabled
and
referred
to the Division of
Rehabilitation Services for evaluation, training and certification as required
by Section 35-1-67, U.C.A.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other issues, including a final
determination of the applicant's candidacy for rehabilitation, attorney's fees
to be awarded herein, and evidence from any other source pertaining to
applicant's employability be specifically deferred to a later time.% A further
hearing on the issue of employability will be determined after all of the
relevant information has been submitted.

Richard G. Sumsion
Administrative Law Judge
Passed by the Industrial Commission of Utah
Salt Lake City, Utah, this / ^ d a y of October, 1984ATTEST:

'"'KlAcrs?
Strasburg, Commission Secretary

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on October tf . 1984 a copy of the attached ORDER
was mailed to the following persons at the following addresses, postage paid:
Charles G. Oman
P.O. Box 853
Castle Dale, Ut. 84513
Virginius Dabney
Attorney at Law
Suite 412, 136 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Henry Chai
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Gilbert Martinez, Administrator, Second Injury Fund
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FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. The applicant herein was injured in an industrial accident on May
12, 1975 during the course of his employment by Peabody Coal Company. The
occurrence of the accident - is not questioned but the extent of injuries
sustained as a result of the accident are subject to considerable doubt.
2. The accident involved a cave-in in which three of the miners lost
their lives and others were injured. One of those w^o was killed was only a
few feet away from the applicant and was trying to rescue others at the time
he was killed. The applicant may not have been able to prevent him from
getting into the situation leading to his death, but apparently the applicant
felt that he could have prevented him from doing so and this has caused him to
have a lot of guilt feelings. After this employee was killed in the cave-in
the applicant turned to run and was struck across the back by one of the mine
timbers. One might suspect that the applicant would have been seriously
injured by this timber but there was certainly no immediate indication of
such. The applicant did say that he experienced a lot of low back pain but on
the other hand he continued working in the search and rescue effort for three
or four more hours and when he finally did go to the Emery Medical Center his
main complaints were emotional not physical. The night of the accident, he
was treated for hyperventilation and given Valium and the Clinic did not even
make note of any low back pain or injury. In fact, the applicant was in such
a state of emotional unrest and confusion that he drove to Page, Arizona for
unknown reasons. His wife was so concerned about him that she followed him to
Page. However, the applicant was seen by a chiropractor in Price on May 15,
1975 and was treated for "traumatic lumbo sacral sprain with radiculitis
unilateral on the left side." He continued - seeing a chiropractor quite
regularly for the next several months. Because of his depression, he also
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went to the Four Corners Mental Health Clinic in Price. There he complained
of restlessness and feelings of anxiety and nervousness and an unwillingness
to go back into the mine. He complained of not sleeping and having dreams of
the horrible incident at the mine. He was also having marital problems and he
embarked upon a course of psychotherapy for the purpose of getting him back
into the mine and helping him with his marriage. This program was successful
and he did return to work in the mine by June 15. He then worked without
interruption until around April of 1976. During that time he continued to
obtain some chiropractic adjustments but it is unknown as to just what extent
or at what frequency- these adjustments were administered. The records of the
chiropractor, now deceased, have not been located.
3. There is no indication that the applicant saw a medical doctor
regarding his back problems until May 4, 1976, approximately one year after
the accident, at which time he saw Dr. N.K. Dean in Price. Dr. Dean referred
him to Dr. Soderberg in Salt Lake City. Dr. Soderberg saw him for the first
time on May 7, 1976. He was noted at that time to have mild limitation of
motion in his back and tenderness in the left buttock. He had decreased
sensation over the lateral aspect of the calf and foot on the left side but
his reflexes and straight leg raising tests were normal. Shortly thereafter a
fusion of his back was recommended but he wanted to wait a while longer. The
fusion was performed on June 29, 1976. This was a three level fusion, two of
which apparently failed making it necessary to refuse the back and this was
done in December of 1977.
A.
After the first surgery, the applicant entered into a
Compensation Agreement with the insurance carrier dated March 21, 1977. This
agreement acknowledged that he had received temporary total disability
compensation from May 12 to June 15, 1975 less two days and again from April
30, 1976 to December 31, 1976. He also received compensation for permanent
partial disability based on a rating of 25% of the whole person. At that
time, no mention was made of any psychiatric problems and no claim for such
was submitted. The applicant has never returned to work following the surgery
of June 29, 1976. Prior to the surgery in December of 1977, the applicant
filed an application for additional benefits specifically noting that a fusion
had failed and that further surgery was recommended.
Liability for the
additional claim was denied but later the insurance company reversed its
position and paid for the additional medical expenses and for additional
temporary total disability through September 7, 1978. No additional permanent
partial disability was paid because Dr. Soderberg indicated the fusion had
been made solid by the second surgery and there had been no increase in the
permanent partial disability.
5. The applicant received social security disability compensation
for approximately four years but these payments were discontinued in 1980.
The termination of the applicant's social security disability benefits may
have prompted his filing for further workmen's compensation benefits. The
applicant's claim for such was filed on August 19, 1982 and his claim at that
time was for additional permanent partial disability or permanent total
disability.
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6.
From the evidence presented, it is clear there has been no
increase in the applicant's permanent partial impairment due to his back
injury, this was rated at 25% by Dr. Soderberg in 1977 and he reconfirmed his
opinion as late as 1982. the only evidence of increased impairment relates to
the ratings recently assigned to his psychiatric impairment which was not
rated by any physician until March of 1983. this rating was assigned by Dr.
Frank Dituri,. a specialist in internal medicine, based upon his application of
the criteria set forth in the Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment
published by the American Medical Association and his assessment of the
applicant's psychiatric problems.
this evaluation was made without the
benefit of any of the records from the Four Corners Medical Center and Dr.
Dituri acknowledged that it would be very helpful to have these records, the
applicant was later seen by Dr. Jack L. tedrow, a psychiatrist, who
essentially confirmed Dr. Dituri*s earlier assessment of a 25% psychiatric
impairment.
Dr. tedrow recently
responded
to
a request from the
Administrative Law Judge relative to the onset of this impairment and it is
obvious from his letter dated August 7t 1984 that he made a mistake with
respect to the date of the industrial accident. In his original report and in
two places in his August 7, 1984 report he refers to the accident having
occurred on March 12, 1979. Obviously, his reference to "finding no evidence
of ratable impairment as early as January, 1977ff, is based on his incorrect
assumption that this was prior to the industrial accident when in fact it was
subsequent to the accident and the records of the Four Corners Medical Health
Center make it rather clear that the applicant did in deed have significant
psychiatric problems immediately following the industrial accident on March
12, 1975. A subsequent letter from Dr. tedrow dated October 12, 1984
confirmed this typographical error and the pre—existing problem but he could
not rate it.
7. In retrospect, with the benefit of hindsight, it appears rather
evident that the applicant's present problems have been greatly magnified by
several factors pertaining to the manner in which his case has been handled.
It seems rather apparent that the applicant's physical impairment resutling
from his industrial accident was not particularly significant. For more than
a year after the accident his physical complaints apparently warranted no more
than periodic chiropractic adjustments and he was able to return to work and
perform his duties in the mine. Similarly, his understandable psychiatric
problems and phobic reaction to working in the mine were significantly reduced
by the treatment he received at the Four Corners Mental Health Center. the
consultation received at the Mental Health Center did enable him to return to
the mine and resume his employment and one might easily have concluded at that
time that the industrial accident had little long range significance. Now,
nine years later, the applicant considers himself permanently and totally
disabled.
there is absolutely no evidence that the applicant benefited in any
way from the first surgical procedure and the second surgical procedure was
only beneficial in the sense of correcting the pseudo-arthrosis.
the
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surgeries took him out of the work environment and created a real inability to
work for a period of time, and this, superimposed upon his psychiatric
problems, have combined to convince him that he is indeed unemployable.
After this long length of time there is probably no realistic hope
for reversing this dismal attitude problem although proper psychotherapy at
the appropriate time may well have been successful. When the applicant became
disabled as a result of his surgeries, there was obvious justification for his
determination of total disability by the Social Security Administration but
this only compounded the problems because it removed him from active
management as a workmen's compensation claim and did nothing to restore him to
suitable gainful employment at a time when this was realistically possible.
The applicant complains that his social security disability benefits were
terminated but in all likelihood the more realistic tragedy is that he was
kept on social security disability as long as he was. At the time of the
accident, the applicant was a young man of only 35 years of age and his
prospects for rehabilitation should have been excellent. the fact that he
remains unemployed nine years later is an indictment on the system and the
applicant's failure or inability to understand the adverse impact of that
system upon him. Consequently, the Administrative Law Judge finds that the
applicant was by no means rendered permanently and totally disabled as a
result of the industrial accident even though the accident combined with the
circumstances that have followed may well have relegated him to that status.
8. Because of the foregoing, it is necessary for the Administrative
Law Judge to view the applicant's claim in three different perspectives:
(1) Whether or not his present claim for additional compensation based upon
his psychiatric problems is nothing more than a modification of the 1977
compensation
agreement and therefore not subject to any statute of
limitations,
(2) Whether or not the psychiatric impairment represented a
significant change in the applicant's condition so as to warrant an award of
additional compensation under the continuing jurisdiction of the Commission
conferred by Section 35-1-78 and, if so, whether or not the Commission still
has jurisdiction to enter such an award more than nine years after the
accident, and (3) Whether or not the applicant can be found permanently and
totally disabled as a result of his industrial accident at this time, in which
case his claim would not be subject to the eight year statute of limitations
set forth in Section 35-1-66, U.C.A. Addressing the applicant's claim from
the first two perspectives mentioned, Section 35-1-78 confers continuing
jurisdiction on the Commission to make such modification or change with
respect to former findings or orders as it may from time to time feel
justified. In the annotation regarding the case of Spencer v. Industrial
Commission 4 Ut 2d 185, 290 P2d 692, it is noted that even though the
"doctrine of res judicata...is not in the strict sense applicable to
proceedings before the Industrial Commission (.)(T)his does not mean that an
applicant can reapply to the Commission for a new determination upon the same
facts merely because he may be dissatisfied with his former order, but it does
mean once the application has been filed and the Commission's jurisdiction
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invoked, it has authority to entertain further proceedings to deal with any
substantial changes or unexpected developments that may arise as a result of
the injury. On this criteria, the Administrative Law Judge finds that this is
not an appropriate case for further consideration under Section 35-1-78. It
is rather evident that the same facts have prevailed for approximately the
last seven years. Even though the psychiatric impairment was not rated until
relatively recently, the impairment itself was obviously in place long ago.
The foregoing is deemed dispositive of the first two perspectives.
As to the third perspective, that of the applicant's claim for permanent total
disability, the Administrative Law Judge finds that the facts warrant a
tentative finding of permanent and total disability simply because the
applicant has not been gainfully employed for the past eight years. The
Administrative Law Judge is firmly convinced that had appropriate measures
been taken, the applicant would have been an excellent candidate for
rehabilitation and would be working today. However his attitude problems may
be so deeply intrenched that rehabilitation will be difficult if not
impossible but his age at least is in his favor. At age 44, he is still a
relatively young man. It is not enough to presume that the applicant can
obtain suitable gainful employment and under circumstances of this type it is
incumbant upon the defendants to demonstrate that he is capable of
rehabilitation. This concept appears to be clearly supported by the case of
Brundige v. XML Freight. 622 P2d 790 (1980).
9. No compensation for permanent total disability is to be awarded
until a final determination is made relative to whether or not the applicant
is permanently and totally disabled. In the meantime, he should be referred
to the Division of Rehabilitation Services for evaluation, training and
certification as required by Section 35-1-67, U.C.A. It is the recommendation
of the Administrative Law Judge that the defendants have the applicant
evaluated at a pain clinic of their choosing and this should be done before
the
evaluation
by
Rehabilitation
Services.
Obviously,
any
other
rehabilitation services the defendants wish to employ would be appropriate.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The applicant is entitled to a tentative finding of permanent and
total disability and referral to rehabilitation services as required by
Section 35-1-67, U.C.A. The facts of this case do not justify a modification
of the prior compensation
agreement entered
into in 1977 and the
Administrative Law Judge does not believe the Commission has jurisdiction to
consider a claim for increased permanent partial impairment at this late
date. This case is clearly distinquishable from the Gamier case on which
applicant relies. Failure to enter an award within the eight year period
prescribed by statute- in the instant case was npt attributable to the
Commission's inability to do so.
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ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant be found tentatively
permanently
and
totally
disabled
and
referred
to the Division of
Rehabilitation Services for evaluation, training and certification as required
by Section 35-1-67, U.C.A.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other issues, including a final
determination of the applicant's candidacy for rehabilitation, attorney's fees
to be awarded herein, and evidence from any other source pertaining to
applicant's employability be specifically deferred to a later time, A further
hearing on the issue of employability will be determined after all of the
relevant information has been submitted.

Richard G. Sums ion
Administrative Law Judge
Passed, by the Industrial Commission of Utah
Salt Lake City, Utah, this. ">j -dav of October, 1984.
ATTEST:

^vT^T> . .^

/

Linda J. Strasburg, Commission Secretary

/
is

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on 0ctoberj2i3.i 1984 a copy of the attached
AMENDED ORDER was mailed to the following persons at the following addresses,
postage paid:
Charles G. Oman
P.O. Box 853
Castle Dale, Utah 84513
Virginius Dabney
Attorney at Law
Suite 412, 136 South Main
Salt Lake. City, Utah 84101
Henry Chai
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Gilbert Martinez, Administrator, Second Injury Fund
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Defendants.
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HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on September 24,
1984, at 1:00 p.m.; same being pursuant to Order and
Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Richard G. Sumsion, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The Applicant was present and represented by Virginius
Dabney, Attorney at Law
The Defendants Peabody Coal Company and/or Old
Republic Insurance were represented by Henry K. Chai,
II, Attorney at Law.
The Second Injury Fund was represented by Gilbert A.
Martinez, Administrator.

FURTHER HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on November 14,
1985, at 10:00 a.m.; same being pursuant to Order and
Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Richard G. Sumsion, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The Applicant was present and represented by Virginius
Dabney, Attorney at Law
The Defendants Peabody Coal Company and/ or Old
Republic Insurance were represented by Henry K* Chai,
II, Attorney at Law.
The Second Injury Fund was represented by Erie V.
Boot-man, Administrator.
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FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order were entered in
this matter on October 9, 1984, and an Amended Order was entered on October
23, 1984, Insofar as the Findings of Fact expressed in the two prior Orders
are not inconsistent with the Findings made herein, the same are incorporated
herein by reference as though fully set forth.
2. The original Order made a tentative finding that the Applicant
was permanently and totally disabled, and he was referred to the Division of
Rehabilitation Services for evaluation, training, and certification as
required by Section 35-1-67, U.C.A. There was a specific finding made that no
compensation for permanent total disability was to be awarded until a final
determination was made relative to that issue.
3. At the last hearing on November 14, 1985, evidence was introduced relative to the rehabilitation evaluation. The Applicant underwent
feasibility studies and was placed in a program where he received tutoring in
basic skills. He made positive but slow progress for a while; but finally on
July 31, 1985, Rehabilitation Services certified that the Applicant did not
meet or no longer met the legal requirement of a reasonable expectation that
vocational rehabilitation services would benefit him in terms of employability. The reason for the certification that the Applicant is not a good
candidate for rehabilitation appears to be threefold: (1) He has borderline
intellectual functioning and reading skills; (2) he suffers from a long-term
depressive neurosis; and (3) he lacks funds that might otherwise enable him to
pursue a long-term rehabilitation program.
4. At the last hearing the Defendants presented a substantial
amount of evidence relative to the Applicant's activities over the past
several years. The thrust of this evidence was to establish that the
Applicant was in fact a partner with his wife in the operation of Kelly's Bar
in Castledale, U*ah, and that he h3d also formerly been involved with his wife
in the operation of Chick's Fish *N Chips. The evidence also strongly implies
that the Applicant derived an unspecified amount of income from Christmas tree
sales. The Applicant testified that the Christmas tree sales were actually an
attempt on the part of his teenage daughter to earn some income and that he
was not involved in this business even though many of the customers wrote out
checks in his name in payment for the trees. He further testified that the
bar and restaurant operations were operated solely by his wife and that his
name appeared on licenses, tax returns, sales invoices, lease agreements,
et cetera, only for the purpose of credit or other business needs but was
never intended ta^an actual partnership.
Some of the evidence presented
showed rather clearly that a lot of personal expenses were being run through
the business accounts, and the evidence rather clearly indicated the Applicant
spent quite a bit of time at the bar and that perhaps he even helped out on
occasion to a limited extent. It seems rather clear from the evidence that
the townspeople regarded the Applicant and his wife as the owners and
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operators of these businesses even though the Applicant's time involvement was
much less than that of his wife.
5. Tax returns filed by the Applicant and his wife were submitted
after the hearing for the years 1979 through 198A. In each case these were
joint returns, but for each year they showed the income and expenses of
Kelly's Bar as a sole proprietorship operated by Charles Oman. The returns
reflect substantial gross receipts from the bar, but the net income for the
years 1979 through 1982 showed either a loss or only nominal net income.
Clearly, if the only thing derived by the Applicant and his wife from the
operation of the bar was the amount reflected as net profit on the tax return,
the operation of the bar could not be justified. The net profit would not
even have been the equivalent of a minimum wage paid to part-time hired help.
The average net profit for the years 1979 through 1983 was only 2.57 percent,
of gross sales. There was an unexplained increase in net profit during 1983
and 1984 even though gross sales remained about the same as they had been
previously-. The net profit in 1983 jumped to 12.86 percent of gross sales,
and the net profit jumped to 20.07 percent in 1984. The last two figures are
believable and would justify the operation of the business. Although the
income from the first four years is suspect, there may be an adequate
explanation; but such an explanation is not deemed important to the issue
relative to the Applicant's permanent total disability.
6. All of the evidence presented from the Applicant's doctors and
from rehabilitation counselors supports the Applicant's claim for permanent
total disability. The prospects of successful rehabilitation are not good,
but there is the suggestion that such might still be accomplished if the
Applicant had sufficient funds to sustain him during a long-term rehabilitation program.
7. A considerable amount of time was spent at the last hearing
reviewing a substantial number of checks made out to the Applicant, many of
which were under $100.00 but some of which were in excess of $100.00 and in
some cases more than $500.00. The Applicant said that these did not represent
income in any way but were checks simply written out by customers who wanted
cash and the Applicant and his wife were willing to cash these checks for
them. The Administrative Law Judge is hardly convinced of any sound business
purpose being furthered by this practice, but there is no specific evidence of
any other purpose. These checks are in addition to the hundred or so checks
written out to the Applicant for Christmas trees. Most of the Christmas trees
appear to have sold for $15.00, with the price range being $10.00 to $20.00.
8. All of the evidence presented by the Defendants was convincing
in showing the Applicant is far from being totally invalid. His activity
level is such that Dave Owens, a captain in the Emery County Sheriff's Office,
did not even know that he was disabled even though he saw him frequently.
Lamar Guymon, sheriff of Emery County, testified that he had observed the
Applicant limping as he walked but he also saw the Applicant frequently during
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the course of a month and knew of his involvement in the operation of Kelly's
Bar.
9. In consideration of all of the evidence presented, the
Administrative Law Judge finds that the Applicant is permanently and totally
disabled, but at the same time believes this determination should be subject
to the continuing jurisdiction of the Commission.
This is admittedly
paradoxical but is based upon the belief that the Applicant's unemployability
is in large part a result of his long-term depressive neurosis condition and
that such might change if the Applicant had a strong enough desire to become
employed despite his known physical limitations. It obviously will not change
absent a change in attitude*
10. The Applicant's combined physical and mental impairment is
44 percent of whole body function* The Defendants entered into a compensation
agreement with the Applicant in 1977 by which he was paid permanent partial
disability for his 25 percent physical impairment, but nothing has ever been
paid for his depressive neurosis. The Applicant's rate of compensation was
$95.33 per week. This is less than the minimum amount payable as of the time
the Applicant was certified as not being a candidate for rehabilitation on
July 31, 1985. The minimum rate in effect at that time was $120.00 per week.
The Defendant Insurance Carrier and its insured have no further liability in
this matter except for the payment of ongoing medical expenses because the
Applicant did not become permanently and totally disabled until after the
expiration of the initial six-year period.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The Applicant is entitled to benefits for permanent total disability
from and after July 31, 1985, subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the
Commission to review and amend as circumstances may require.

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Administrator of the Second Injury
Fund preprre the necessary vouchers directing the State Treasurer, as
Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, to place Applicant on the Second Injury
Fund payroll and to pay Applicant compensation at the rate of $120.00 per week
commencing July 31, 1985, and continuing thereafter at intervals of not more
than every four weeks until further Order of the Commission. The accrued
amount shall be payable in a lump sum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendants Peabody Coal Company and/or
Old Republic Insurance pay all medical expenses incurred as the result of this
accident, said expenses to be paid in accordance with the Medical and Surgical
Fee Schedule of this Commission.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Virginius Dabney, attorney for the
Applicant, be paid the sum of $5,994.00, payable directly by the Applicant in
installments of such amount as may be agreeable between the Applicant and his
attorney, but no less than $450.00 out of the accrued amount payable and
thereafter in installments of no less than $80.00 per month. Should there be
any failure to pay as agreed or per the minimum stated above, there shall be a
suspension of benefits to the Applicant and benefits will be payable to his
attorney as may be ordered by the Commission.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof,
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

Richard G. Sums ion
Administrative Law Judge
Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
day of December, 1985.
ATTEST:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on December
//
1985, a copy of the attached
Supplemental Order in the case of Charles G. Oman issued December
//
,
1985, was mailed to the following persons at the following addresses, postage
paid:
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator
Second Injury Fund
P.O. Box 45580
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0580
Henry K. Chai, II, Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
Virginius Dabney, Attorney at Law
Kearns Building, Suite 412
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Charles G. Oman
P.O. Box 853
Castledale, UT 84513
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VIRGINIUS DABNEY, ESQ., #0795
DABNEY & DABNEY, P.C.
Attorneys for Applicant
Kearns Building - Suite 412
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 34101

Telephone: (801) 328-9000
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UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

a

DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE AND DISABILITY

Applicant,
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION/

11
-vs-

MOTION FOR REVIEW

12
-13
14

PEABODY COAL COMPANY [ Employer ], OLD
REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY [Insurance
Carrier for che Employer], and che
SECOND INJURY FUND OF THE STATE OF
UTAH,

Case No. 82002249

15
Defendants•
16
17

13

COMES NOW che Applicant, pursuant Co che Utah Workers' Compensation and

19

Occupational Disease statutes, and the Rules and Regulations of che Utah

20

Industrial Cannission, inter alia, and requests che Industrial Cannission to

21

review the Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of Che

22

Administrative Law Judge of December 11, 1985 relative co che onset date of

23

permanent cotal disability benefits, and interest, only, and m'suoport chere-

24

of, alleges and represents as follows:

25
26

vides that the cannencanent date of permanent cotal disability benefits i s che

27

date of Che Rehabilitation Services Letter certifying chat Che Applicanc was

23
DAJBNET * . DABNEY
<CAMNS
:•

SU I U S I N G

S C - M *AIN

$*-"" U K t Z - "

1. That the Supplemental Order of December 11, 1985 specifically pro-

SUTTT 4 1 2
$-*«*. - - " * MlOt

1
not

a candidate for reasonable vocational rehabilitation services, namely

2
July 31, 1985.
3
4

2.

That computing permanent total disability benefits based upon the

date of the rehabilitation letter is inconsistent with long standing Indus5
trial Cannission

policy wherein permanent

total disability benefits onset

6
7
8
9
10
11
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

dates are canputed from the date of the employee's industrial accident, or the
date the anployee last worked, whichever is later. Permanent total disability
is computed frcm that date on a permanent total disability weekly benefits
basis with all temporary total and permanent partial disability compensation
deducted frcm that anount for the purpose of determining the continuation date
of permanent total disability benefits.
3.

That counsel is not aware of any other permanent total disability

ccomencement date in any other claim ever being held to comnence with the date
of a State Office of Education Rehabilitation Services certification letter,
and that the only reason for doing so would b£ to lessen the financial exposure of emploeyrs, and in this case, the Second Injury Fund.
4.

That the July 31, 1985 onset date is contrary to nunerous findings by

the Cannission, and other matters contained in the medical evidence which
argue for an earlier date, assuming that the canputation basis normally used
by Che Industrial Cannission should in one manner or another be modified:

29

specifically, the appropriate dates relative to the permanent cotal disability

22

question in this case are as follows:

24

a*

The date of the industrial accident was May 12, 1975.

25

b*

The Applicant has not worked since 1976; in fact, the Adminis-

26

trative Law Judge in the Amended Order of October 23, 1984 specifically found

27

chat "... the Applicant has not been gainfully employed for Che oast eight

2g

years." Amended Order, p. 5 (emphasis added).

1
c.

The Application alleging permanent total disability is dated

2
June 11, 1982 and it was filed on August 19, 1982,
3
d.

4

The first hearing held in this matter involving, among other

things, the issue of permanent total disability, was held on September 29,
5
1984.
6
7

a
9
10
11
12
-

e.

Dr. Potts, the Applicant's treating physician of approximately

five years, indicated the Applicant's permanent total disability status on
September 24, 1984 by stating that he "... unable to work or perform steadily
..." and that he doubted that "... his position [would] improve".
Exhibit No. A-l.
f.

The Administrative Law Judge in the Amended Order of October 23,

1984 specifically concluded that "... the facts warrant a tentative finding of
permanent and total disability...."

.16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Hearing

g.

Amended Order, p'. 5 (emphasis added).

The State Office of Education Rehabilitation Services cannenced

vocational feasibility studies of the Applicant in October, 1984 and attempted
to rehabilitate the Applicant for a period of almost nine months, all without
success. See Hearing Exhibit No. A-19.
h.

The Administrative Law Judge by letter to the State Office of

Education Rehabilitation Services referred the Applicant for vocational rehabilitation by that agency on November 15, 1984.
i.

Dr. Bradford D. Hare of the University of Utah Pain Clinic

23

indicated that Che Applicant was unable Co work, and was imoaited in social,

24

family and vocational functioning, in a medical report dated February 13,

2g

1985, further substantiating his total disability status.

2Q

j.

Ms. JoAnn Pace of the Four Comers Cormunity Mental Healch

27

Canter in Castle Dale, Utah further substantiated Che Applicant's permanent

2g

total disabilicy by letter of May 21, 1985 by indicating chat "... ny iaores-3-

sion at this time is that the Applicant
stress disorder with depression.

is suffering from past traunatic

His runination of the traunatic event, his

anxiety and severe physical pain could most definitely prevent him fran working at this time.11
k.

Dr. Donald L. Ruben, a psychiatrist in Price, Utah, pursuant to

a rehabilitation referral, indicated that the Applicant was not rehabilitable
now or in the future, was not employable now or in the future, and was not
able to partake in a^ new vocation, and was in fact 100% disabled, in a letter
dated July 10, 1985.
1.

Even the Administrative Law Judge's Supplemental Order of Decen-

ber 11, 1985 emphasizes that "all of Che evidence presenced from the Applicant's doctors and frcm rehabilitation counselors supports Che Applicant's
14
15
16
17
13

claim for permanent total disability" (emphasis added).

In this regard, the

several medical reports, principally from Dr. Potts [09/24/84], che Four
Comers Mental Health agency [05/21/85] and Dr. Ruben [07/10/85], strongly
infer that Che Applicant was permanently and totally disabled at least as
early as September 24, 1984, by medical records and opinions alone!

19

5. That because the onset date selected by Che Administrative Law Judge

20

of July 31, 1985, the dace of Che State Office of Education Rehabilitation

21

Services certification letter, clearly constitutes an error in law, it is

22

respectfully requested that Che onset date be computed in accordance wich che

23

usual and customary

24

Unquestionably, Che earlier Application date (June 11, 1982), che filing date

25

(August 19, 1982), the first medical opinion letter of permanent total dis-

26

ability (September 24, 1984), and the date of che Centative finding of perma-

27

nent total disability conclusion by Che Administrative Law Judge (October 23,

23

1984) agree strongly for an earlier onset date.

Industrial Cannission practice as

-4-

referred Co aoove.

In suggesting chese alcerr.a-

1

tive dates, however, Che Applicant is not in any way waiving his position ChaC

2

the usual and customary practice of the Industrial Commission to commence

3

benefits as of the date of the accident, or the date of last employment, with

4

appropriate offsets for temporary total compensation and permanent partial

5

compensation being made, is in reality, the appropriate way to compute perma-

6

nent total disability benefits owed to Mr. Oman in this case.

7

6.

That in addition, it should also be noted that pursuant to Utah Code

8

Annotated 535-1-78 (1981), the Applicant is also entitled to interest on all

9

amounts from the point in time when they were otherwise due and payable, which

10

such interpretation of Section 78 has recently been upheld by the Qtah Supreme

11

Court in the decision of Marshall v. Industrial Commission, (1985).

12

fore, to the extent that the Supplemental Order of December 11, 1985 does noc

13

include a provision for interest, it should also be accordingly modified.

There-

14

WHEREFORE, the Applicant respectfully requests that an appropriate and

15

earlier onset date be made in this case, and that an appropriate award be made

16

for interest pursuant to Section 78 in accordance with the Utah Supreme Court

17

recent ruling on that question.

18

DATED this 19th day of December, 1985.

19
20
21
22

Actoraeys. foe AnaLicaat. ,

23
CERTIFICATE OF MAILII

2d
25
26
27

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the :oregoing
document, postage prepaid, on this the 19th day of December, 1985, to the
following:

-5-

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Utah Industrial Ccranission
L60 East 300 South
P. 0. Box 45580
Salt Lake City, Utah

84145-0580

Erie V. Boorman, Esq.
160 East 300 South
P . O . Box 45580
Salt Lake CiCy, Utah 84145-0580
Henry K. Chai II, Esq.
SNCW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTIJJEAU
9 Exchange Place, 12th Floor
P. 0. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Mr. Charles G. Oman
P. 0. Box 853
Castle Dale, Utah 84513

12
13
14
15

Attorneys/for Applicant

16
17
13
19
20
21
22
23
2*
25
26
27
23

-o-

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 82002249
*
CHARLES G. OMAN,
Applicant,
vs.
PEABGDY COAL COMPANY and/ or
OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE and
SECOND INJURY FUND,

*
*

ORDER

*

GRANTING

*
*
*
*
Defendants.
*
*
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

MOTION FOR REVIEW

On December 11, 1985, an Administrative Law Judge of the Commission
issued Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order awarding
the Applicant in the above captioned case permanent total disability benefits,
to be paid by the Second Injury Fund beginning July 31, 1985, the date when
the State Office of Education Rehabilitation Services certified that the
Applicant was not susceptible to rehabilitation. On December 20, 1985, the
Applicant's attorney filed a Motion for Review objecting to the date payments
were ordered to begin.
The Counsel for the Applicant argues that the
Commission practice has been to award permanent total disability benefits
either beginning the date the employee was injured, or the date the employee
ceased working. The Counsel for the Applicant also requested an award of
interest on the benefits awarded. The Commission is of the opinion that an
earlier date is appropriate for the beginning of the permanent total
disability benefits, however the Commission declines adding interest to the
award. A brief review of tha file follows.
The Applicant was injured, while in the course of his employment, on
May 12, 1975 in a mine cave-in. The Applicant injured his back, and had two
back surgeries as a result.
The Applicant also experienced considerable
psychiatric problems resulting from the trauma involved in the cave-in (in
which several miners were killed).
The Applicant returned to work
approximately one month after the cave-in, and worked for almost a year
afterwards, during which time he saw a chiropractor.
In June 1976, the
Applicant had back surgery (performed by Dr. T. Soderberg) and the Applicant
was deemed stabilized in December 1976. The Defendant/carrier paid temporary
total compensation in 1975 and 1976 for the periods the Applicant did not
work, and also paid for a 25% permanent partial impairment rated by Dr.
Soderberg in December 1976. The Applicant required additional surgery in

CHARLES G. OMAN
ORDER
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December 1977 as a result of non-fusion, and the Defendant/carrier paid for
the sursery and the attendant temporary total disability. The Applicant was
declared stable in September 1978, and no further permanent partial
impairment, beyond the 25% already awarded, resulted.
On August 18, 1982, the Applicant, through counsel, filed an
Application for Hearing with the Commission, claiming permanent total
disability benefits, or additional permanent partial impairment benefits. In
support of the claim, in November 1983, the Counsel for the Applicant
submitted two physician reports.
Both reports discussed the Applicant's
psychiatric impairment resulting from the May 12, 1975 accident, and one of
the reports rated the impairment at 25% of the whole man. The Defendants
denied a claim for further permanent partial impairment benefits based on the
8 year Statute of Limitation specified in U.C.A. 35-1-66. The Counsel for the
Applicant argued that the Statute of Limitation did not apply because the
issue was permanent total disability for which the Supreme Court determined no
Statute of Limitation applied, and because the Cotnmission had continuing
jurisdiction under U.C.A. 35-1-78. A Hearing was held September 24, 1984, and
the Administrative Law Judge issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order on October 9, 1984. The Administrative Law Judge made a tentative
finding of permanent total disability, and the Applicant was referred to the
State Office of Education Rehabilitation Services. On November 14, 1985, a
second Hearing was held to allow testimony regarding the Applicant's
empioyability. This issue arose when it was determined the Applicant may have
had some involvement in several businesses in which his wife and daughter were
engaged.
The final Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order, now at issue, was filed on December 11, 1985. In that Order, the
Administrative Law Judge found the Applicant permanently totally disabled as a
result of Rehabilitation Services' inability to rehabilitate the Applicant
after nearly one year of attempts. The Administrative Law Judge ordered the
Second Injury Fund to begin permanent total disability benefits as of July 31,
1985, the date Rehabilitation Services certified the Applicant as not
susceptible to rehabilitation. On December 20, 1985, the Commission received
the Applicant's Motion for Review arguing for an earlier date when permanent
total disability should begin, and requesting an award of interest on the
final aw?rd. The Counsel for the Applicant submits a long list of alternative
earlier dates that should have been selected by the Administrative Law Judge
as the beginning of permanent total disability. These include, May 12, 1975
the date of injury; sometime in 1976 when the Applicant ceased working; June
11, 1982 the date of the Application for Hearing; August 19, 1982 the date the
Application was filed; September 24, 1984 when the Applicant's treating
physician first found the Applicant to be permanently totally disabled;
October 23, 1984, the date the Administrative Law Jud$e tentatively found the
Applicant to be permanently totally disabled; November 15, 1984, the date the
Applicant was referred to Rehabilitation Services, February 13, 1985, when the
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University of Utah Pain Clinic doctor found the Applicant disabled; May 21,
1985, when a community health center employee found the Applicant was
prevented from working; and finally, June 10, 1985 when a psychiatrist found
the Applicant was not employable or rehabilitative.
The Commission is of the opinion that the first date of medical
confinnation of the Applicant's permanent total disability status is a more
appropriate date to begin permanent total disability benefits. The Commission
therefore finds the benefits should begin as of September 24, 1984. The
Commission finds that an award of interest is inappropriate, and therefore the
final Commission award is as follows.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Administrator of the Second Injury
Fund prepare the necessary vouchers directing the State Treasurer, as
Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, to place Applicant on the Second Injury
Fund payroll and to pay Applicant compensation at the rate of $120.00 per week
commencing September 24, 1984, and continuing thereafter at intervals of' not
more than every four weeks until further order of the Commission. The accrued
amount shall be payable in a lump sum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendants, Peabody Coal Company
and/or Old Republic Insurance, pay all medical expenses incurred as the result
of this accident, said expenses to be paid in accordance with the Medical and
Surgical Fee Schedule of the Commission.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Virginius Dabney, attorney for the
Applicant, be paid the sum of $5,994.00, payable directly by the Applicant in
installments of such amount as may be agreeable between the Applicant and his
attorney, but no less than $450.00 out of the accrued amount payable and
thereafter in installments of no less than $80.00 per month. Should there be
any failure to pay as agreed or per the minimum stated above, there shall be a
suspension of benefits to the Applicant and benefits will be payable to his
attorney as may be ordered by the CommissionV

Stephen M. Hadley, Chairman \
Walter- T. Axelgard/ Commissioiyar
Lenice L. Nielsen, Commissioner
Passed by the Industrial Commission
of .Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah this
XjflrW of March, IS
'Linda J. Strasburg, Commission/Secretary

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on March
1^
1986, a copy of the attached
Granting Motion for Review in the case of Charles G. Oman issued March /J
, 1986, was mailed to the following persons at the following addresses,
postage paid:
Erie V. Boatman, Administrator of the Second Injury Fund
Henry K. Chai, II, Atty., P.O. Box 3000, SLC, UT

84110

Virginius Dabney, Atty., 136 South Main, Suite 412, SLC, UT 84101
Charles G. Oman, P.O. Box 853, Castledale, Utah 84513

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

Carol Olson

